Trade Agreements, Negotiations, and Institutional Design (Pre-Recorded)

Session Submission Type: In-Person Full Paper Panel

Session Description

Trade agreements of one type or another now govern a significant set of trade interactions in the world. Scholars have long recognized significant variation among these agreements in their design. And while many studies have examined the general determinants of entry into and effects of these agreements, much less research has examined the politics behind particular design choices. In short, what governs the variation in trade agreement design? These papers examine various theories concerning how governments approach agreement negotiation and design, examining a wide set of trade agreements. Given the importance of these agreements to the conduct of international commerce, understanding how these agreements come to be and the particular forms they take is essential to understand their origins and influence.

(Pre-Recorded Discussant)

Sub Unit

• Division 16: International Political Economy

Cosponsor

• Division 17: International Collaboration

Individual Presentations

• Trade Agreements: What Do Governments Maximize? - Francesco Amodio, McGill University; Leonardo Baccini, McGill University

• What Can We Learn from Failed Economic Negotiations?: Lessons from BITs and PTAs - Lauren C. Konken, Princeton University; Haillie Na-Kyung Lee, Seoul National University

• A Deepening/Widening Tradeoff? Evidence from the GATT and WTO - David H. Bearce, University of Colorado, Boulder; Cody D. Eldredge, Oakland University

• PTA Negotiations, Institutional Design, and Uncertainty - Edward D. Mansfield, University of Pennsylvania; Helen V. Milner, Princeton University; Jon C. W. Pevehouse, University of Wisconsin, Madison

Chair

• Judith Lynn Goldstein Stanford University

Discussant

• Judith Lynn Goldstein Stanford University