The Political Theory of Sentiments and Passions

Session Submission Type: In-Person Full Paper Panel

Session Description

Emotions play a significant role in human life. They have been the subject of research not only for psychologists and psychiatrists but also for sociologists in the area of social psychology, political scientists in the area of political psychology, cultural historians in the area of the history of emotions, and business scholars in the area of organizational behavior—just to name a few.

There has also been a long tradition for normative political theorists and moral philosophers to study emotions (or sentiments and passions, as they are often called) and their role as the foundation for morality or motivations for actions, but the normative status of emotions never ceases to be controversial. Often portrayed as the nemesis of human reason, sentiments and passions are understood as normatively irrelevant, as they are not always reliable guides for us to identify what is right or wrong. Worse still, some passions, such as greed, pride, and resentment, are condemned as causing more harm than good to individuals, societies, and politics, as they leave behind them a history full of violence, stupidity, and prejudices.

On the other hand, we cannot help appreciating the role that some sentiments and passions have been consistently playing in encouraging sublime actions and even promoting the common good of humanity, such as the love of truth and truthfulness. We even doubt if the weakening of some purportedly “harmful” passions is desirable. For example, the loss of the sense of honor may lead to shameless citizens and politicians, and the loss of resentment may numb our sensitivity to injustice. In the face of these controversies, normative political theorists and moral philosophers are obliged to answer these questions: Does our understanding of sentiments and passions change over time? If so, then how? How shall we weigh the pros and cons of sentiments and passions in our social and political life? And how shall we tame useful but dangerous passions in accordance with their nature such that they do us more good than harm?

The four presentations on the panel are aimed to shed new light on these questions in diverse ways. Lorraine Pangle sets the starting point of our investigation at ancient political thought. She examines the love of truth and truthfulness in Plato’s Theaetetus and its complex relationship with passions that we think ought not to be relevant to them, such as fear, pride, hope, acquisitiveness, and the desire for honor. In this so-called “post-truth” era of pandemics, the love of truth and truthfulness appears to be even more necessary but face no fewer obstacles. We then turn to Antong Liu’s presentation on Machiavellian love of honor and glory and how it helps resolve a problem of the political ethics of citizens in an imperfect republic: those who wish to establish a just rule cannot avoid standing up to the unjust rule of the present, but their successful resistance may weaken the authority of the rule that they establish—either by igniting their own ambition to usurp this rule for their own sake or by setting an example for their challengers to fiercely resist this rule. In discussing how the Machiavellian love of honor helps strike a balance between citizens’ political entrepreneurship and rule-abidingness, Liu evaluates how the sense of honor may be useful even to citizens of contemporary constitutional democracies to resist injustice. Next, Constantine Vassiliou presents an account of the changing understanding of honor in eighteenth-century political thought, focusing on the thought of Montesquieu. Although Montesquieu was an enthusiastic booster of commerce, he warned that our attachment to liberty will weaken as commercial mores come to dominate our psychological dispositions. Vassiliou compares Montesquieu with his Scottish contemporaries and emphasizes Montesquieu’s moderate response to this problem, which avoids the clash between a liberalism of self-interest and a republicanism of selfless civic virtue. Essential to this response are the propensity for social distinctions and an innovative understanding of honor based on this propensity. The Montesquieuian understanding of honor helps balance the pursuit of wealth and the public good. Finally, John Scott and Michelle Schwarze present their critical reconstruction of Adam Smith’s argument for restricting justifiable resentment, an unruly passion that nevertheless serves as the basis for our sense of justice. They discuss the nature of Smith’s understanding of justice, the relationship between justice and resentment, and why resentment alone cannot be a sufficient justification for punishment. This reconstruction leads Scott and Schwarze to conclude with Smith’s normative justifications for severing the tie between improper resentments and punishment and for limiting the propriety of resentment.

Sub Unit

• Division 1: Political Thought and Philosophy

Individual Presentations

• Plato’s Theaetetus on the Love of Truth and Truthfulness - Lorraine Pangle, University of Texas, Austin

• Machiavellian Honor and Political Ethics in an Imperfect Republic - Antong Liu, University of Maryland

• Montesquieu’s Moderation: Honor and Public Virtue in an Age of Modern Commerce - Constantine Vassiliou, University of Houston

• Narrowing the Scope of Resentment in Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments - John T. Scott, University of California, Davis; Michelle A. Schwarze, University of Wisconsin, Madison

Chair

• Alexandra Oprea Australian National University

Discussant

• Michael C. Hawley Duke University