Formal Models of Diplomacy and Conflict

Session Submission Type: In-Person Full Paper Panel

Session Description

The papers on this panel develop formal models to study related topics in international conflict. Ramsay and Reich develop a theory of conservation negotiations that highlights the tension between countries that want to conserve a resource and those who own and want to utilize the resource for development. Schram and Kenkel study crisis bargaining games in which actors can engage in a wide range of low-level, costly policy options that can shape final political outcomes in their favor. Jordan and Trager study how attribution problems arising from cyber warfare affect third parties' incentives to sabotage international cooperation. Reich develops a model of dynamic screening in crisis bargaining.

Sub Unit

• Division 4: Formal Political Theory

Individual Presentations

• Conflict and Conservation (Pre-Recorded) - Kristopher W. Ramsay, Princeton University; Noam Reich, Princeton University

• Uncertainty in Crisis Bargaining with Multiple Policy Options - Peter Schram; Brenton Kenkel, Vanderbilt University

• Stability, Attribution, and Third Parties in Cyberspace - Richard Pell Jordan, Baylor University; Robert F. Trager, UCLA

• Negotiations as a Dynamic Screening Process - Noam Reich, Princeton University

Discussants

• Robert F. Trager UCLA

• Scott Abramson University of Rochester