Voter Decision-making in Primary Elections

• In Event: Sincere and Strategic Voters

Abstract

Primary elections are of large consequence for public policy and representation yet political science lacks basic understanding of how voters make choices in nominating contests. A variety of theoretical models have been proposed, but equilibrium outcomes depend centrally on two parameters difficult to measure. First, whether primary voters are sincere or strategic. Do they vote for the candidate who best matches their preferences regardless of downstream consequences, or do they act in anticipation of consequences for the general election? Second, if acting strategically, vote strategies depend upon primary voter beliefs about the nomination outcome in the other party's primary electorate. Here, we evaluate whether primary voters are strategic by presenting causal estimates of the response by primary voters to information about the other party's nominee. Sincere voters would not respond to information about their general election opponent while strategic voters would revise their actions. Using regression discontinuity designs from primary elections, general elections, and primary runoff elections our estimates inform assumptions about the strategies of primary voters in theoretical models of the consequences of nomination politics.

Author

• Seth J. Hill, University of California, San Diego