IO Funding Knowledge and Donor Public Preferences for Multilateral Foreign Aid

• In Event: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy

Abstract

Despite growing interest in why and when donor publics support foreign aid and how earmarked funding affects donor control, to date, no research has investigated how information about how governments provide can provide multilateral aid—especially through earmarked funding—affects public preferences. Consistent with principal-agent theory, we expect concerns about control to be a key determinant in individuals’ preference for multilateral or bilateral aid delivery. However, we also hypothesize that if the public knew about the option to earmark—an option that exists and is in use across nearly all international organizations—support for delivery through international organizations will increase.

Results from nationally representative samples in the U.S. and in Germany show that information about the possibility of earmarking and earmarking benefits increase support for giving aid through an IO over the bilateral alternative. Information about costs, in contrast, increases the preference for bilateral aid. Yet among those who chose the multilateral option information about the benefits of earmarking lead to a greater willingness to earmark. Our results further suggest that Americans and Germans who prefer the delivery of aid through an IO react differently to the ability to earmark and to earmarking costs. The sheer possibility of earmarking moves Americans toward earmarking but not Germans. Costs of earmarking deter Germans from earmarking but not Americans. Our results offer a corrective to the misleading dichotomy often drawn between multilateral and bilateral delivery and provide clear evidence that public support for delivery through IOs increases when the public is aware of earmarking. We also advance the growing literature on IO financing and public opinion and foreign aid.

Authors

• A. Burcu Bayram, University of Arkansas

• Erin R. Graham, University of Notre Dame