Revisiting Relationship Between Nuclear Weapons and Interstate Conflict Behavior

• In Event: Escalation and Mediation

Abstract

How do nuclear weapons change interstate conflict behavior? Does acquiring nuclear capability deter aggression or make states more likely to engage in military disputes? Despite the central importance of these questions, existing research provides us a significant degree of theoretical indeterminacy. This lack of understanding is partly because there is little or almost no prior research on how domestic factors may influence the effect of states’ nuclear capability on their likelihood of initiating conflicts. This paper explores how variation in a particular aspect of domestic politics i.e. civil-military relations, affects the relationship between nuclear weapons and the likelihood of initiation of interstate conflicts. I argue that nuclear weapons create an emboldening effect on conflict initiation by elevating the capacity of states to engage in conflict. Such emboldening effect occurs in states with high military influence which are more risk prone. In this way, the interactive effect of nuclear weapons with militarism in states increases the likelihood of conflict initiation. I test my argument using a series of estimators including pooled logistic regression and fixed effects estimation.

Author

• Rizwan Asghar, University of California, Davis