Crime, Politics and Policing: Evidence from India

• In Event: Crime, Policing and Militarization Strategies

Abstract

Many politicians in developing democracies engage in illegal activities, giving them strong incentives to subvert law enforcement institutions. This paper argues that the election of criminals has negative effects on policing that go beyond the impunity of the politicians themselves. It tests this claim in the context of Indian state elections, using a regression discontinuity design that focuses on races where a politician facing a serious criminal charge barely won or lost. The election of a criminal politician leads to a reduction in reported levels of types of crime especially vulnerable to selective reporting, and no change in other types of crime. One mechanism for this reduction is the ability of criminal politicians to appoint sympathetic or inexperienced senior police officers---the election of criminals is associated with the transferring in of younger officers and officers from upper caste groups. The results suggest that the criminalization of politics can create a self-reinforcing cycle of poor law enforcement.

Authors

• Alexander Lee, University of Rochester

• Jae Eun Kim, University of Rochester