Informal Inequalities: Gender, Machine Politics, and Representation in Argentina

• In Event: Clientelism and Formal Political Institutions in Developing Countries

Abstract

Why does the gender gap in political representation persist in democracies that adopt sweeping institutional reforms to level the playing field? Over the past three decades, many countries have adopted quotas to increase the number of women in elected office. Among countries with 30% or more women in parliament, 81% had reserved seats, legislative candidate quotas, or voluntary party quotas (Global Database of Quotas for Women). Although quotas’ effectiveness has varied across cases, there is abundant evidence that, overall, quotas increase women's number in elected positions. Yet, while quotas alleviate gender discrimination in formal institutions, they cannot modify informal institutional arrangements that reinforce gender bias in everyday politics. In this paper, we zero in on one prevalent informal institution: political clientelism. We argue that clientelism perpetuates gender discrimination in the recruitment and selection of female political candidates. Through a focus on the division of political work among female and male brokers and the importance of clientelistic networks in providing a springboard for men’s political careers (but not women’s), our paper shines a light on how informal inequalities thwart female representation even in countries with gender quotas on the books. Combining quantitative and qualitative data from a collection of municipalities in Argentina, a country that was one of the original adopters of gender quotas, we provide evidence for the persistence of the gender gap in political representation, particularly at the local level. Our argument thus highlights how informal institutions can undermine formal institutions designed to advance equality.

Authors

• Mariela Szwarcberg Daby, Reed College

• Mason Wallace Moseley, West Virginia University