Auction for Votes: Political Parties and Private Brokers in Local Elections

• In Event: Parties and Representation

Abstract

The clientelistic network between patron, brokers and clients has received extensive attention in the literature. Earlier studies focus extensively on how patrons engage and incentivize brokers and how the latter mobilize the electorate. However, much less attention has been paid to the demands of brokers towards patrons and why these demands are met. Our paper seeks to address this gap in the literature and focuses on private brokers in local elections using plurality voting. Our argument is two-fold. First, we show that political parties use private brokers when the polls are tight and the likelihood of swing votes is high. Second, this situation gives brokers leverage and puts them in a position to ask political parties to bid for their support. The brokers can provide a certain number of votes (hundreds or thousands) at a specific cost. Political parties know that if they do not meet the price, it is open for auctioning to other parties. We use evidence from the September 2020 local elections in Romania, using semi-structured interviews with representatives of political parties and private brokers. The findings illustrate how private brokers determine political parties to match their demands. The mechanism combines rationality and effectiveness of threats.

Authors

• Sergiu Gherghina, University of Glasgow

• Aurelian Giugal, University of Bucharest

• Dan Niculae Podaru, University of Bucharest