Search
Browse By Day
Browse By Time
Browse By Person
Browse By Mini-Conference
Browse By Division
Browse By Session or Event Type
Browse Sessions by Fields of Interest
Browse Papers by Fields of Interest
Search Tips
Virtual Exhibit Hall
Change Preferences / Time Zone
Sign In
X (Twitter)
Businesses are largely absent from scholarship on distributive politics in developing democracies. Existing research focuses on the relationship between politicians, voters, and strategies such as vote-buying and patronage by party brokers. Drawing on firm-level data and surveys of politicians and business owners, this paper demonstrates that the imperative to raise funds for political campaigns leads politicians to invest in publicly provided private goods rather than efficient income transfers or growth-enhancing public goods, benefiting large firms in concentrated sectors such as manufacturing and media, while imposing costs on a heterogeneous and fragmented retail sector. By developing a sectoral theory of campaign finance in developing democracies, the paper bridges scholarship on redistribution, clientelism, and business in poor democracies.