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The ancient Greek world is widely recognized as a rich source for thinking about the virtues. Moderation, or sōphrosunē, in particular receives sustained consideration by the greatest political philosophers of antiquity and has a theoretical sophistication that we find lacking in our time. Edith Hamilton describes the matter well when she says, “The truth is that this quality, this sōphrosunē, which to the Greeks was an ideal second to none in importance, is not among our ideals. We have lost the conception of it.”
Many scholars interested in establishing a more robust vision of virtue, to the extent that they turn to the ancients, rely especially on Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean. My aim in this paper is to make the case that we should turn instead to Plato, where one finds a more promising vision of moderation than a mean between extremes. I do so by clarifying the meaning and importance of moderation in Plato’s political philosophy through an examination of this virtue’s role in the Republic.
In Book IV of the Republic, Socrates defines moderation as a harmony of the city and of the soul. But this definition of moderation stands in need of interpretation, especially since it is not the only definition of moderation that the dialogue provides. Before we arrive at Book IV’s definition, we find a different one in Book III. There Socrates identifies the most important elements of moderation according to the many as “being obedient to the rulers, and being themselves rulers of the pleasures of drink, sex and eating” (389e). This definition which understands moderation in terms of mastery stands in contrast to the harmony of the whole soul and city described in Book IV.
Few commentators address the connection between these two definitions, aside from noting the disparity between them. By following the evolution of Socrates’ arguments, I show that the Republic leads readers from a conventional understanding of moderation as mastery (of better over worse) to the compelling ideal of moderation as a harmony within city and soul. Examining moderation in the Republic not only deepens our grasp of Platonic political thought but also enables us to appreciate the potential significance of this ancient virtue for contemporary politics.