Parties, Centralization and Forest Protection

• In Event: The Political Economy of Deforestation

Abstract

Decisions about when and where to exploit or preserve natural resources depend on the demands of constituents, and how those demands are translated through political institutions. In this paper I investigate how two sets of political institutions affect designation of protected areas and deforestation rates. First, I examine whether politicians favor preservation or exploitation in core/swing/opposition districts, arguing that swing districts should have the higher rates of exploitation than either core or opposition districts. Second, I test whether this varies by the level of centralization in forest management. I argue that decentralization results in more overall exploitation because local politicians face fewer of the negative environmental externalities of these policies. However, centralized control (potentially through strong party cohesion) results in stronger electoral deforestation cycles as the need for short-term goods from exploitation outweighs the need for long-term goods for preservation as elections approach.

Author

• Luke Sanford, Yale University