On the Peaceful Transition of Power

• In Event: Domestic Origins of Conflict

Abstract

The uncertainty and violence associated with the breakdown of political order stresses the importance of strategic challenges that surface during transitions of political power. To understand these challenges, I develop a framework that highlights a key incentive condition---the sovereignty constraint---which emerges from a ruler's unique political position as the sole director of organized violence. I show that a peaceful transition of political power, and the stability of political order, essentially requires the ruler to consent to her own removal. Analysis of the sovereignty constraint reveals two critical levers that are important ingredients of political stability, the threat of rebellion and economic destruction, each of which are used to motivate the ruler to relinquish power, identifying a tradeoff between maintaining economic efficiency and protecting political order. I apply the sovereignty constraint to transitional justice and highlight novel upstream strategic incentives resulting from transitional justice policies that ultimately undermine political stability.

Author

• Scott Tyson, University of Rochester