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The international system has become increasingly connected, with globalization and cyberspace allowing knowledge sharing to transcend borders. However, with increasing cross-border interdependencies come heightened geopolitical, cyber, and security risks. Canada, the United States, and the rest of the Five Eyes rely heavily on shared intelligence to mitigate these risks. Furthermore, major corporations are increasingly hiring their own intelligence professionals to protect employees and investments abroad and in cyberspace. These private sector intelligence professionals rely heavily on intelligence sharing with both private and public sector partners, and this cooperation transcends national borders. This raises the question: to what extent is intelligence still a national activity? While spies and analysts at the Central Intelligence Agency and other Intelligence Community members work in the national interest and are regulated accordingly, private sector analysts work at the behest of their corporation and may not even be citizens of the country in which their company is headquartered.
In this paper, I explore the transnationalization of public-private intelligence sharing and apply the international relations concept of transnational networks to understand to what extent intelligence cooperation transcends borders. Intelligence cooperation is traditionally challenging to study due to classification and lack of available data. My research relies on primary source data collected from extensive qualitative interview and survey research with public and private sector intelligence practitioners. Interviewees revealed contrasts across countries: for example, countries such as France openly shared competitive intelligence with their corporations while American agencies face regulatory constraints.
While government officials face strict restrictions on sharing intelligence, these constraints do not apply to their private sector counterparts. Furthermore, government entities outside of the Intelligence Community face fewer restrictions. Using the U.S. State Department’s Overseas Security Advisory Council as a case, I examine how government partners at times play an active role in transnational intelligence sharing regardless of nationality, while in other cases—such as the FBI’s InfraGard, nationality continues to guide public-private intelligence sharing. This research reveals areas of national security—notably protection of critical infrastructure and of employees working abroad—in which intelligence can be shared through public-private partnerships regardless of nationality in order to pursue common security goals.