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This paper concerns the manner in which Aristotle weaves pleasure and pain into his discussion of the particular moral virtues from courage to justice. While a wealth of scholarship has been produced on the thematic accounts of pleasure in Books VII and X of the Ethics, little attention has been given to Aristotle’s disclosure of the problem of pleasure in the first six books, a crucial yet strangely neglected topic, given Aristotle’s own statements on the importance of studying pleasure for ethics, politics, and political philosophy (NE 1105a11-18, 1152b1-3).
Aristotle argues that pleasure and pain are persistent and potential impediments to virtuous action and prudence. In the moment that someone is affected by pleasure, they undergo a radical alteration and misperception of the world (NE 1113a24-1113b2). Moreover, our longing for pleasure is deeply engrained and pleasure attends all action throughout life. Moral habituation is therefore necessary for becoming immune to the deception of pleasure by inculcating the proper disposition of our longings. Most fundamentally the virtues are dispositions of the longing part of the soul which feels pleasure and pain and is radically moved by pleasure and pain. In brief, Aristotle’s insight into the dynamic and powerful role of pleasure and pain in human action informs his presentation of the education to virtue.
The purpose of the present paper is to articulate the manner in which each of the particular virtues from courage to justice express themselves in relation to pleasure and pain. Courage, for example, involves a habit of toughness with respect to the painful fear of death necessary for noble actions. Moderation involves a strength of appetite, an aspect of virtue that is necessary for progress in the higher virtues. Each disposition toward the pleasures and pains pertaining to money, honor, gain, and social relations is taken up in turn. Following the line of pleasure and pain clarifies and deepens our understanding of the logic and goals guiding Aristotle’s education to virtue in the Nicomachean Ethics.