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Does the degree to which external support provided by states to insurgencies is made public affects rebel patterns of violence? Conflict studies have increasingly scrutinized how external sponsorship influences civil war dynamics. Still, the literature has yet to examine how different forms of assistance can each have their own impact on patterns of violence. This article aims to assess whether material sponsorship’s overtness impacts conflict intensity and civilian victimization. Overtness is defined as the external sponsor’s degree of public recognition of their material support provided to insurgents. We hypothesize that rebels overtly supported are engaged in more intense conflicts with the incumbents but are less likely to deliberately target civilians. These hypotheses stem from the way both the expectation, and thereafter the reception of such support, alter the strategic incentives facing rebels. We test this argument using original data on the overtness of foreign sponsorship. Statistical analyses yield strong support for both our hypotheses. We then further probe the causal mechanisms identified with a case study on the Libyan Civil War of 2011. This article shows that, in addition to the type of material aid they receive, rebels are influenced by the publicness of assistance provided by foreign benefactors.