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An Ambivalent Offshore Balancer, At Best

Sat, October 2, 10:00 to 11:30am PDT (10:00 to 11:30am PDT), TBA

Abstract

How committed is the United States to offshore balancing? John Mearsheimer, in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, makes a compelling case that the United States has traditionally acted as an offshore balancer, intervening in other regions to forestall the rise of potential hegemons when local states have proven unequal to the task. In this project, I take issue with the latter claim. The stopping power of water, I argue, means that the United States can afford to remain indifferent to the balance of power abroad, because it is insulated from direct threats. The United States can even tolerate the emergence of another regional hegemon on the scene, which at worst can pose an indirect threat. If the United States has an incentive to remain the only regional hegemon in the international system, it is to enjoy the freedom to roam that comes with that. The freedom to roam, however, is a luxury and not a necessity, which means that the benefits that flow from it need to be weighed against the costs of balancing. When major war looms on the horizon, those costs become salient and are substantial enough to make balancing controversial. Even in cases where the United States ends up balancing, the outcome is contingent rather than inevitable. Because of the stopping power of water, in other words, the United States is an ambivalent offshore balancer, at best.

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