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Why do militaries intervene in politics in some countries and not in others? The institutionalist literature contends that legitimacy and capacity of civilian political institutions or the professional autonomy provided to the military organization constrain military behavior and ensure civilian supremacy (Huntington 1957, Welch 1976, Stepan 1988). The sociological literature argues that the military should be civilianized and brought closer to the society to ensure civilian political control (Janowitz 1961). The culturalists focus on the importance of historical political culture and citizen participation in state institutions as a deterrent to military intervention into politics (Schiff 1996, Finer 1962). The rationalists contend that civilian supremacy over the military can be explained as strategic interaction between civilian principals and military agents to advance their interests (Feaver 2003). These theoretical models, however, do not adequately explain why the military that possesses overwhelming coercive power, remains loyal to its political masters and what conditions are required in order to make the political institutions credible for the military for unconditional compliance.
I argue that strength of property rights, instituted by a state, shapes the degree of civilian supremacy over its military. What mechanism links the strength of property rights to the degree of civilian supremacy over the military? I argue that, when property rights are secure, transaction costs are reduced and individuals and groups in society have an incentive towards efficient use of resources in order to maximize their utility. This leads to the separation of economy from political domination, leading to economy efficiency and growth. An efficient economy based on secure property rights tends to benefits all groups, which increases trust between them, leading to social consensus on the on the institutions of the state, thereby making these institutions credible. By securing property rights, the state loses arbitrary power against its citizens, but that ‘loss’ is compensated by the increase in the legitimacy of its institutions. If legitimacy of the state is backed by strong property rights and the resulting social consensus on institutions, such backing endures legitimacy and makes it independent of periodic crises in the economy. In such societies, the military will have neither incentive nor opportunity to intervene into politics, because, if the military intervenes, it will have to face the collective wrath of the state and the population. Such a situation makes civilian domination of political institutions robust and deters the military from intervening into politics.
On the other hand, when property rights are not secure, the elite groups limit access of the population to markets in order to generate rent and secure their privileges (North et al, 2007). This increases transaction costs, makes the economy inefficient and lowers the sharing of benefits among individuals and groups. In such societies, lack of accommodation of group interests reduces trust between them and increases the so called “prisoners’ dilemma”. Existence of prisoners’ dilemma among groups reduces cooperation and prevents them to build consensus on the “rules of the game”, leading to reduction in the legitimacy of the state and credibility of its institutions. This provides both incentive and opportunity for the military to intervene into politics in several ways. First, the political regime loses legitimacy from the larger population and becomes dependent on the military for regime survival, which opens the door for the military to intervene into politics. Secondly, lack of open access to markets and resources and the resulting low economic growth and sharing of benefits might lead to conflict in the society. For the military, a hierarchical and corporate organization, the existence of social conflict poses a threat to its corporate coherence and integrity as such conflicts might spillover into its ranks. This increases the disposition of the military to intervene into politics in order to protect its corporate coherence and integrity. Finally, insecure property rights lead to the emergence of rent-seeking social order, which is based on the distribution of patronage, spoils, perks and privileges among ruling elite including the military. But the regime cannot equally satisfy everyone in the military, which creates factionalism among the officer corps and divides it along the “loyal” and “suspect” groups of officers. As the regime gives more incentives to the loyal officers, the remaining officers feel they are betrayed, which gives incentive for the alienated officers to intervene into politics. These three conditions, created by the insecure property rights, collectively provide opportunity and disposition for the military to intervene into politics, which opens the door for authoritarian and praetorian politics.