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In the ethics of warfare, it is usually thought that for a violent conflict to be morally justified, it must have a just cause. Such an endorsement of just cause is near unanimous, with most theorists accepting Jeff McMahan’s canonical definition of “just cause” as a “goal.” Yet, despite just cause’s importance in the ethics of warfare, little scholarship has been done to examine the formal notion of just cause and how such a formal notion can affect revolutions. As a result of the relatively sparse scholarship on just cause, and its interplay with revolutions, it remains a question as to what constitutes a formal just cause and what constitutes a just cause for revolution. In this paper, I attempt to answer these questions. To do so, I plan on examining McMahan’s formal notion of just cause. I argue that McMahan’s view of just cause—which maintains that just cause is best understood as a “goal”—is partially incorrect. Primarily, while McMahan’s vocabulary serves as a good starting point for thinking about just cause, his goal-based view of just cause faces concerns about rightful intention and comparison. Because of these shortcomings, I build upon McMahan’s view and argue that just cause is best understood in terms of reasons. Ultimately, understanding just cause as reason-based allows for a plurality of formal constructions, including sufficient and pro tanto constructions. After advancing this reason-based, formal view, I consider what reasons count in favor of revolution. I argue that various reasons can justify revolutions. Such reasons include rights-based justifications, which include reasons of self-defense, punitive reasons, political rights violations, and democratization. When considering these rights-based reasons, I argue that reasons of preventive warfare do not count in favor of revolution. Furthermore, I defend the view that lesser-evil justifications also count as reasons in favor of revolution. To close, I examine how my presentation of just cause affects ongoing conflicts, such as the pro-democracy movements in Hong Kong and Eastern Europe.