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All societies transitioning from authoritarianism to democracy have to reckon with members and leaders of the repressive apparatus. Three fates await these actors: They may be (1) purged and have to seek employment elsewhere; 2) amnestied and integrated back into the new democratic state; or 3) criminally prosecuted. The first two strategies are costly: Purges may deprive the new democratic regime of much needed expertise once agents of the previous regime are replaced with inexperienced loyalists of the new democratic regime; policy implementation may suffer simply because the new bureaucrats lack the necessary training to understand how transition circumstances will affect policy outcomes. Reintegrating former agents of the regime to serve new democratic leaders is risky because their loyalties may lie with their previous authoritarian bosses; they can sabotage policy implementation in order to influence outcomes that better align with their own agenda. The third option is criminal prosecution. There are difficulties with this choice also, which I argue have not been sufficiently explored by transitional justice scholarship. This paper makes use of the Global Transitional Justice Dataset as well as a novel dataset on former authoritarian elites’ presence in leadership positions in new democracies to uncover the patterns of authoritarian elite turnover in key sectors of society: the state administration, political parties, the military, and business.