Search
Browse By Day
Browse By Time
Browse By Person
Browse By Mini-Conference
Browse By Division
Browse By Session or Event Type
Browse Sessions by Fields of Interest
Browse Papers by Fields of Interest
Search Tips
Virtual Exhibit Hall
Change Preferences / Time Zone
Sign In
X (Twitter)
This article sheds light on the false dichotomy of state versus market and provides an alternative model of durable institutionalized compromise. I argue effective market solutions arise when normally competitive production actors organize to solve their problems and speak together with one voice to shape policy. Despite historical differences in both state and associational structures, the cases of French wine and German core manufacturing share three essential characteristics: producer structures that cultivate consensus; deliberate historical action to ‘tame’ or reign in a powerful state; and the role of quasi-public institutions to playing ‘honest broker’ between organized interests and the state. The consequence of these structures is depoliticized (überparteilich) but informed public policy, which protect decentralized collaborative value-enhancing production structures
My analysis redirects “business versus the state” debate, considering the inclusiveness of the political consensus underlying policy, and the subsequent dynamics between powerful producer groups and the state apparatus. It is not a matter of ‘the state’ nor ‘the market’, but a matter of institutionalised problem solving, equitable power distributions, and states powerful enough to protect and legitimate these bargains. Leaving market problems up to ‘the market’ privileges dominant production actors. Yet state solutions to market problems are rarely able to incorporate and leverage the first-hand producer market knowledge; state solutions can also be vulnerable to political influence. The path I describe in my article avoids the pitfalls of the other two models.