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This paper explores whether and how polygyny is related to social unrest. We propose three theoretical mechanisms related to different dimensions of grievance-inducing and, partly, greed-related inequality, which may occur in polygynous societies. These dimensions include:
(i) Economic, reproductive and social inequality resulting in relative deprivation among non-elite men (i.e. ‘vertical inequality’ where polygyny implies a monopolization of women by the elite).
(ii) Inequality within elites when it comes to the distribution of resources and inheritance, both related to the relative position of dependent family members in a clan (i.e. ‘horizontal inequality’ where the polygynous elite itself may fall victim of instability and internal violence). We proxy this measure by a unique, newly compiled data set on unequal inheritance in polygynous societies.
(iii) Gender inequality in general, since highly patriarchal structures and inequality between sexes make up the core of polygynous family structures. In order to earn the bride price, women are ‘sold’ into marriages by their families, thereby reinforcing the dominant role of males and foregoing the benefits of more gender-diverse societal and political structures, such as women’s more peaceful strategies of conflict resolution.
Using data for 41 African countries from 1990-2014, we provide evidence for these mechanisms and their relationship to four different types of social unrest (violent, non-violent, organized, and spontaneous). We find that medium levels of polygyny, gender inequality and vertical economic inequality are positively associated with both the intensity and incidence of all four types of social unrest under consideration. For horizontal inequality, the feasibility of mobilization seems to be particularly important. Countries with higher average incomes and high levels of inequality within polygynous families have a higher probability of unrest compared to similar countries without horizontal inequality.
The robustness of our results is tested through alternative and complementary hypotheses such as strategic behavior of elites, population growth that relaxes tight marriage markets, and an excess of male deaths that could possibly be balanced by polygynous marriages (implying possible reverse causation), all of which we are able to reject.