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Release, Kill, Rule, Recruit: The Role of Reputation in Hostage-Taking Violence

Fri, October 1, 6:00 to 7:30am PDT (6:00 to 7:30am PDT), TBA

Abstract

During armed conflict, many armed groups, including rebels, terrorists, and paramilitaries take hostages. While some hostages are released relatively unscathed in exchange for ransom or other concessions, others suffer terrible—often fatal—violence at the hands of their captors. What explains this variation? In this paper, I argue that armed group kidnapping behavior is a function of their territory of recruitment. If the group operates in a territory with local support, then the VPO will operate as a “stationary bandit,” prioritizing a reputation for reliability through repeat interactions. Such groups use kidnapping as a method of exchange, and will be likely to release hostages alive. Conversely, armed groups that do not count on local recruits use kidnapping as a means to signal their resolve and intentions more broadly, to attract recruits and support from outside their territory. These groups are more likely to privilege spectacular violence over exchange. Using evidence from an original, cross-national dataset of the kidnapping behavior of 234 armed groups, I demonstrate that geography of recruitment is a crucial factor in explaining violence toward hostages.

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