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The Inegalitarian Equality of the Declaration of Independence

Tue, September 28, 2:00 to 3:30pm PDT (2:00 to 3:30pm PDT), TBA

Abstract

The American Declaration of Independence has come to symbolize the radical rupture as well as the enduring democratic promise of the American founding. Beginning with early abolitionist thinkers and continuing through contemporary theorists like Danielle Allen, readers have figured the Declaration's language of equality as a repository of revolutionary egalitarian principles awaiting their fulfillment in the polity.
One problem with this reading is that it treats equality as a static concept, projecting a contemporary understanding of the meaning of the concept backward in time. In fact, however, the meaning of the concept of equality has shifted dramatically over time. In this paper, I argue that, when it was written, the meaning of equality in the Declaration was radically inegalitarian. That is, the document did not offer a conception of egalitarian and universal moral equality. Instead, drawing on a close reading of the document and the texts of over ninety state and local declarations which preceded it, I argue that the Declaration offered a fully coherent normative vision of inegalitarian equality.
To make this argument, I advance two interrelated historical and conceptual claims. First, I show that the Declaration offered a particular conception of what I term 'English equality,' an inegalitarian form of equality situated within imperial logics and defined by both internal and external hierarchies. The equality asserted by the colonists in the Declaration was the final salvo in a long imperial legal dispute over whether the British constitution understood colonial Englishmen to be equal in standing – within the complex and hierarchical transatlantic society – to metropolitan Englishmen.
Second, I show that any egalitarian reading of the document must contend with the problem of authority. Building on work by Bonnie Honig and Jacques Derrida, I show that the performance of declaring American independence only works, so to speak, because those who do the declaring are invested with the privilege and authority to declare from within existing, inegalitarian colonial polities. The Declaration does not – indeed, cannot – contest these hierarchies. Its principle of equality necessarily announces and re-inscribes existing hierarchies in the distinction between those who have the performative privilege to make the declaration and those who do not.

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