On the Move: Dictators, Security and Capital Relocations

• In Event: Building Autocracy: New Theoretical Insights and Empirical Findings

Abstract

Existing research shows systematic differences between democratic and autocratic regimes on several policy outcomes, including those pertaining to infrastructure and investment. In this paper, we consider one of the most sweeping policy decisions that a government may undertake: relocating the capital to a different (and often brand new) city. While a fairly rare event, we compile data on all capital relocations in independent states from 1789 to the present. Our initial analysis shows that autocracies are much more likely to relocate their capitals than democracies. This pattern holds up even when accounting for plausible confounders such as income level, urbanization, and colonial history. Next, we develop a theoretical argument on the incentives of autocrats to retain the old capital or relocate to a new city. Existing studies on capital relocations, mostly from other disciplines, have highlighted motives that often reflect the public statements of leaders, such as environmental concerns, boosting economic development, or enhancing national unity. In contrast, our argument focuses on less sanguine motivations, notably the relocation of capitals as a means for autocratic regimes to mitigate internal or external security threats and thus reduce the probability of regime breakdown. Drawing on several illustrative case studies, including recent ones from Kazakhstan and Myanmar, we focus in particular on the incentives to relocate capitals to less populated cities and areas where popular uprisings or coups threatening the regime are less likely to occur. We derive several empirical implications from this argument. We subsequently test these empirical implications on our extensive global dataset, using different estimators and model specifications.

Authors

• Carl Henrik Knutsen, Department of Political Science, University of Oslo

• Lee Morgenbesser, Griffith University