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How does an authoritarian party sustain its resilience with seemingly coercive tactics yet still maintaining steady popular support? I contend that studying the rise of the CCP and the demise of the KMT during the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) sheds important light onto this question. Based on previously underutilized party archives, I first show that the “sins” of the KMT (e.g., heavy fiscal burden, hyperinflation, and corruption) were also widespread in CCP controlled base areas before and during the Sino-Japanese War, thus it is puzzling that the CCP did not generate as much mass resentment as the KMT did. The key differences, I argue, are the principals through which the CCP and the KMT managed fiscal extraction from the society. I contend that the CCP rely on grassroots party organizations to reshape the focal point of societal conflicts and mobilize ordinary citizens to become agents of the party. Meanwhile, the KMT delegated fiscal extraction to the existing local elites whose tactics entailed coercive and regressive distribution of tax burden. Hence, the KMT’s principle for fiscal extraction resulted in mass resentment, but not the CCP’s. I test my argument with a novel dataset on fiscal extraction, party building, and migration under the CCP and the KMT between 1921-1949. This paper generates important implications for Chinese citizens’ unwavering support of the CCP, who uses similar tactics in many policy domains since 1949, even including today’s online censorship and diffusion of criticism towards the party.