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A Coercive Theory of Autocratic Regime Transitions: Evidence from China

Sun, October 3, 2:00 to 3:30pm PDT (2:00 to 3:30pm PDT), TBA

Abstract

How do autocrats consolidate power? In this paper, I present a theory of autocratic regime transitions in which the military plays a central role. A formal model illustrates how shifts in civilian elites’ control over the military can shape elite power struggles and foreign conflict. When an autocrat consolidates control over the military, it increases their coercive advantage in intra-elite bargaining. When a rival has the potential to gain control over the military in the future, it gives the autocrat incentives to launch purges and to dismantle succession institutions. An extension of the model shows how leaders who already dominate the military also have incentives to instigate foreign conflict in order to stave off elite challengers, even though it can place the wider ruling coalition in peril. I examine the theory’s predictions with evidence from China, including new archival evidence and a new dataset of over 150,000 appointments to top posts in the People’s Liberation Army from 1949 to the present. I show that in China, shifts in network connections between civilian and military elites predict attempts by leaders to purge rivals, undercut succession plans, or instigate foreign conflict.

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