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Intervener’s Trade-off: Plausible Deniability and Indirect Control in Proxy Wars

Thu, September 30, 6:00 to 7:30am PDT (6:00 to 7:30am PDT), TBA

Abstract

External states expend a significant amount of resources supporting local proxies in foreign conflicts. The content of external support however tends to vary across conflicts. While existing literature characterizes external support as a cheaper alternative to direct military intervention, it largely ignores that some form of external support is strategically more costly than others. For instance, the prospect of plausible deniability is higher for material form support (e.g. money, weapons etc.) as they are easier to channel through other neighbouring states, which makes it less costly for the intervener. By contrast, non-material support such as training, access to territory allows interveners to maintain better control over their proxies, but the cost is higher as these types of support make it harder for the intervener to deny their involvement. This paper addresses the following questions: why do external states choose to provide different types of support to their local proxies? Does the content of support correspond with the strategic preference of the external states? I develop a theoretical framework that relates the types of external support (i.e. money, weapons, troops etc.) with the level of commitment of the intervener, as well as the degree of divergence between rebel group’s and intervener’s political goals. The explanatory scope of the theory is evaluated with a detailed case study of external intervention in Afghanistan (1979-1992).

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