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Alliances typically entail a balancing act between dual risks of abandonment and entrapment. A great power seeks support from allies on issues it cares about, without committing to support for allies on issues it doesn’t. When alliance partners’ preferences are misaligned, each of these risks looms large, discouraging mutually-beneficial investment in the alliance. How can a prospective ally assure an uncertain great power that their preferences align in order to mitigate these risks? This paper presents a formal model which shows that joining a military intervention can credibly signal that a potential ally’s preferences align with the great power’s. Doing so reduces the risk of both abandonment and entrapment, incentivizing great power alliance commitment even though the alliance investment itself increases the risk of entrapment. This finding turns on its head the standard argument that alliances increase the likelihood of military intervention, and implies that interventions are a potential mechanism by which a great power can identify loyal allies that buy into its vision for international order. These results are illustrated by Australia’s participation in the Korean War, which was motivated primarily to precipitate an alliance with the US by signaling that Australia would be a reliable military ally.