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The Modern Prince: Consent, Coercion, and Fidel Castro

Sun, October 3, 10:00 to 11:30am PDT (10:00 to 11:30am PDT), TBA

Abstract

Given the diversity of groups that compose a revolutionary coalition, it is inevitable that disagreements and conflicts will arise. In fact, these internal squabbles can fracture a group, destroying a political movement and its advances. Therefore, in order to ensure that a political movement that can produce viable, long-term political changes, it is vital to maintain political alliances through these coalitionary quarrels.

Here, it is extremely valuable to turn to Antonio Gramsci’s Modern Prince to address the maintenance of political alliances in a revolutionary situation. For too long, though, Gramsci scholars have interpreted the Modern Prince solely as a codeword for the communist party. Because this view of the Modern Prince has dominated, few Marxist scholars have examined how the Modern Prince connects to the topic of political alliances. However, the fact of the matter is that understanding the vital role that the Modern Prince plays in maintaining political alliances will help Marxists better understand how to maintain unity among different groups that are similarly situated for radical struggle.
In this paper, rather than understanding the Modern Prince as a codeword for the communist party, I turn to contemporary scholarship on Niccolò Machiavelli to understand the role that consent and coercion play for the Modern Prince. Particularly, I turn to John McCormick’s “Machiavellian Democracy” and Yves Winter’s “Machiavelli and the Orders of Violence.” Specifically, I posit that Gramsci’s Modern Prince must garner consent through inclusive and deliberative practices that allow for compromise. Moreover, I also posit that the Modern Prince’s use of coercion ought to be understood as communicative, conveying its support for class struggle and its opposition to groups that threaten class struggle.

Due to the abstractness of both consent and coercion in my Gramscian analysis, I turn to Fidel Castro—from 1953 to 1968—as an illustrative case. Through an analysis of his speech, “Words to Intellectuals,” I hope to show how Fidel Castro was able to simultaneously garner consent through deliberative practices and to exercise coercion communicatively in order to maintain a revolutionary coalition. Because Castro garnered consent and exercised coercion, similar to the Modern Prince, I argue that he was able to sustain their revolutionary struggle and enact long-term political change.

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