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Corruption and Tax Evasion: Evidence from China

Fri, October 1, 2:00 to 3:30pm PDT (2:00 to 3:30pm PDT), TBA

Abstract

Tax compliance is an important topic in the comparative political economy of development. The level of tax evasion is an indicator of people’s conforming to social contracts, and whether they pay enough taxes determines the capacity of states to implement their social policies. Tax payment and collection involves three actors: the government, the tax collector, and the taxpayer. In a normal equilibrium, the taxpayer pays full tax and receives public service from the government. The government gets total tax while providing public goods to payers. Tax collectors should have no personal gains from the collection itself. These interactions form a social contract where payers comply with tax payments, conducted by collectors, and the government provides public goods in exchange.

However, in weak institutional contexts, unconstrained and unchecked power is a common problem. Corruption (especially at the so-called street level) is pervasive, while the government is not capable of supervising tax collectors or payers. In this case, corruption poses a challenge to the implementation of existing social contracts about tax collection. There are two possible mechanisms through which corruption undermines tax compliance. In an “exchange” situation, government supervision on tax collection is weak. The taxpayer pays both a bribe and a reduced tax to the collector. Collector keeps bribe and hands in only the reduced tax to the government. Bribery here enables collectors to receive more and payers to pay less, forming a corrupt exchange where government loses revenue.

In a “breach” scenario, on the other hand, politicians and bureaucrats ask for briberies in daily activities in exchange for public service that should be available to citizens for free. These corruption activities break the social contracts between taxpayers and the government. As a result, payers choose not to conform to the social contracts and reduce their payment amount. Thus, the taxpayer evades tax payment, leading to less tax collection by the government and no personal gain for the collector. These two scenarios are observable in weak institutional contexts (e.g., developing countries) with widespread corruption and ineffective government supervision.

The problem that corruption causes tax evasion is especially severe for small and medium enterprises (SMEs) since their formal connection with the government is relatively weak. The number of SMEs is enormous for developing economies, where the informal sector is prominent. In China, for example, SMEs contribute to 80% of the country’s employment, about 70% of patented invention rights, more than 60% of GDP, and more than 50% of taxes (Zhao, 2020). The vast proportion of tax collected from SMEs indicates that SMEs’ tax evasion problem is essential for maintaining a robust state capacity. Further, considering the limited size of each SME, it is challenging for the government to establish a strong formal relationship with most enterprises. Therefore, the government may fail to monitor the tax payment of each firm, while tax collectors may have more discretionary power in tax decisions for SMEs. These phenomena make both the exchange and the breach scenario more likely to occur.

This research thus addresses the interaction between corruption and firms’ tax evasion activities. Based on a representative survey data of Chinese SMEs in 2015, I focus on (1) whether corporate corruption actions impact their tax evasion activities; (2) which one or more mechanism (“exchange” or “breach”) explains corruption’s impact on corporate tax evasion; and (3) how does the effect of corruption on tax evasion vary by other factors (e.g., enterprise scales, firm locations, entrepreneurs’ prior political connections, and their professional backgrounds).

To address the endogeneity problem of corruption measurement, this research adopts China’s anti-corruption campaign as an instrumental variable (IV) for corruption expenses. I use the existence of inspection groups (the upper-level government’s approach for detecting local corruption problems) and the number of removed officials in each city as the measurement of IV. These measures are believed to be exogenous because the sequence of inspection groups (and the related official removal) is not chosen by the severity of local corruption problems. Variations of anti-corruption campaigns can also predict the changes in firms’ corruption costs and tax payments in both theories. A balance check between inspected and non-inspected cities demonstrates this exogeneity.

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