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Race, Rawls, and Relational Equality: Liberalism and Racial Justice

Fri, October 1, 2:00 to 3:30pm PDT (2:00 to 3:30pm PDT), TBA

Abstract

This paper explores the capacity of Rawlsian political theory to address issues of race and racism. Charles Mills has been among the strongest proponents of the idea that an appropriately modified, non-ideal Rawlsian original position can guide our thinking about racial justice. Carol Pateman, among others, is skeptical about the usefulness of Rawlsian theory, or contract theory more generally, for these purposes. Following the logic of Mills's argument as far as it can take us, I conclude that Pateman is for the most part correct about the limits of Rawlsian contract theory for addressing racial justice. A non-contractual, relational approach, I argue, is necessary for adequately addressing justice in societies with a white supremacist history. Within this alternative relational theory, I nonetheless acknowledge the potential value of something like a Rawlsian original position for helping us to think about the particular policy remedies that might be necessary for addressing issues like racial wealth or housing inequities in our current society.
The larger point I mean to make with this paper is that liberal political theory, as currently understood, is inadequate for taking on racism and promoting racial justice. The move to a more relational liberalism is needed.

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