Policy Bundling and Costly Monitoring

• In Event: Multi-Dimensionality in Policy Problems

Abstract

When is having one elected official better than two? The traditional view is that there is more democratic accountability with more elected officials. Voters can more accurately assign credit and blame when elected officials are in charge of small, specific policy areas. However, monitoring multiple officials is costly, and therefore may lead to lower accountability because voters will not pay attention or not vote. This is particularly salient in U.S. local elections, where there are often multiple overlapping jurisdictions with separate elections and elected officials. Using a formal model of electoral accountability, I show that having two officials is better when politicians are policy motivated, but may be worse when politicians are office motivated. Further, when monitoring is costly, voters are willing to exert more effort to monitor a single politician in charge of two policy areas than two politicians each in charge of a single area.

Author

• Gregory Sasso, Emory University