Search
Browse By Day
Browse By Time
Browse By Person
Browse By Mini-Conference
Browse By Division
Browse By Session or Event Type
Browse Sessions by Fields of Interest
Browse Papers by Fields of Interest
Search Tips
Virtual Exhibit Hall
Change Preferences / Time Zone
Sign In
X (Twitter)
Do military alliances have impact on civil wars? Military alliances are mainly one of devices for international cooperation. On the other hand, their influence on intrastate conflicts has remained unaddressed. Since military alliances are a credible commitment to the support of one state for another, they should influence internal peace if the existence or design of alliances implies military intervention. In this paper, we argue that military alliances and their provisions operate so that the probability of civil war onset is lowered. First, the presence of military alliances will be credible threats to rebel groups within allies because they will expect other allies to intervene to stop rebellions. Furthermore, we expect that the three specific provisions of military alliances (i.e. militarily intervening in allies’ domestic politics, stationing troops, and economic aids) also have noticeable effects. When rebels observe these provisions, their expected probability of victory will be lowered as rebels’ expected costs of fighting will be increased since these provisions guarantee the military support of other allies to the current governments of allies. We quantitatively test our claims through the use of the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) and Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) Armed Conflict datasets. As a result, we find that while the existence of an alliance and the provision of other allies' interventions contribute to lowering the probability of civil war onset, the effects of the provisions of stationing troops and economic aids identified here are not significant. Our research suggests that military alliances can serve the two ends, that is, international and internal peace.