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Influential voices in academia and the media contend that democracy is in decline worldwide and threatened in the US. Given the recent surge of populism in the West and the presidency of Donald Trump, such concern is natural. But does historical experience and statistical evidence support the recent anxiety? Using a variety of measures, I show that the global proportion of democracies is actually at or near an all-time high; that the current rate of backsliding is not historically unusual; and that this rate is well explained by the economic characteristics of existing democracies. I confirm that breakdowns tend to occur in countries that are poor, have had relatively little democratic experience, and are in economic crisis. Extrapolating from historical data, I show that the estimated hazard of failure in a democracy as developed and long-lived as the US is extremely low--far lower than in any democracy that has ended in the past. Some suggest that undemocratic public attitudes, political polarization, and the erosion of elite norms threaten US institutions, but there is little evidence that these factors--in the absence of military defection--cause democratic breakdown. And, in fact, recent data from the World Values Survey suggest an increase in support for democracy worldwide. While deterioration in the quality of democracy in countries such as Hungary, Poland, and the US is itself cause for concern--as is the reversion to authoritarianism in Russia and Turkey--alarm about a global slide into autocracy is challenged by currently available evidence.