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The Rhetorical Roots of Du Bois's Double-Consciousness

Tue, September 28, 2:00 to 3:30pm PDT (2:00 to 3:30pm PDT), TBA

Abstract

Since W.E.B. Du Bois’s development of the idea in The Souls of Black Folk (1903), “double-consciousness” has become a central concept in African American thought. Its intellectual sources and role in Du Bois’s politics have been widely studied. But previous accounts have overlooked a key source of the concept, and this oversight has important consequences for our understanding of Du Bois’s emancipatory politics. Specifically, this paper argues that double-consciousness is a rhetorical concept—one derived, in part, from Du Bois’s education in classical rhetoric. Rhetoric is one of the oldest sources of the idea of a divided self—a consciousness of being watched—as a source of both power and, potentially, anguish. Understanding older treatments of the divided self can help to resolve some important puzzles in Du Bois’s work: for instance, how can “looking at one’s self through the eyes of others” be both a “gift” and a “wrenching of the soul”? This paper examines the correspondences between the idea of the divided self in Du Bois and the classical rhetoricians he studied, and demonstrates the importance of this link to understanding Du Bois’s role in the Black appropriation and transformation of the rhetorical tradition.

Scholars such as Dickson Bruce Jr., Arnold Rampersad, and Shamoon Zamir have identified two main sources for Du Bois’s notion of double-consciousness: Transcendentalism (where it referred to tension between exalted and everyday consciousness) and psychological literature (where it referred to multiple personalities). But Du Bois adds something critical to the concept, for which neither source can account. That is the idea of objectification—specifically objectification as a paradoxical source of power. This strand can be most plausibly traced to rhetoric. The classical rhetoricians to whose work Du Bois was exposed (mainly via A.S. Hill’s influential textbook, The Principles of Rhetoric) did not use the term “double-consciousness.” But the idea of a divided self and a consciousness of others’ gaze are central concepts in the tradition that Du Bois studied.

Quintilian, for instance, emphasizes the orator’s divided consciousness as an alternative to a unitary self-presentation. Quintilian advises the orator to use his “inner theater” to self-induce the emotions he aims to produce in the audience: “it is the man who is really sensitive to such impressions who will have the greatest power over the emotions.” For Quintilian, we begin to speak by dividing ourselves in two. The ability to do so is a source of both power and turmoil: he immediately explains how to demand justice for a murder victim by visualizing the murder in gory detail. His precursors also devote considerable attention to the theme of “watching oneself being watched”: Cicero discusses the importance of projecting into the minds of listeners in order to protect oneself from their arbitrary judgment.

Double-consciousness is rhetorical, then, because learning to see oneself as an object in the eyes of others is central to rhetorical theory and practice. Demonstrating this link sheds light on Du Bois’s work in two ways. First, it points to his role in the Black transformation of classical rhetoric in the 19th and early 20th centuries. In this transformation, practices of oratory and political action that were formerly the property of an elite were appropriated by members of an oppressed people. Aspects of the classical tradition that were only implicit for the elite—such as the turmoil of dividing the consciousness, or the fear of subjection to the onlooker’s “contempt” (in Du Bois’s words)—become more fully realized in Black rhetoric. In Quintilian, the pain of dividing the consciousness ends when the rhetorical situation ends. But Du Bois’s Black subject neither enters into double-consciousness willingly, nor can expect to exit it, absent sweeping political change.

Second, Du Bois writes that “the history of the American Negro is the history of this strife…to merge his double self.” But our understanding of what “merging” means will depend on our reading of the initial division. In the rhetorical reading, one exits the state of double-consciousness by ending the rhetorical situation that necessitated it. For Du Bois, double-consciousness is itself a resource that can be turned against the problem of the color line. If we privilege the Transcendentalist or psychological readings of double-consciousness, we might imagine Du Bois thinks that double-consciousness can be resolved through individual self-overcoming; but if we privilege the rhetorical reading, we would conclude that he sees any possible resolution in terms of collective political action. This reading has the added benefit of drawing links between those sections of Souls that address Black consciousness and those that address political action (such as its critique of Booker T. Washington), as well as between Souls as a whole and Du Bois’s later socialist writing.

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