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While election schedules in autocracies are subject to the dictator’s manipulation, few have attempted to explain the timing of autocratic elections. Why do some dictators hold elections on time, while others change the election date or cancel elections? This paper argues that dictators’ scheduling decisions hinge on their self-estimated strength. Events around election schedules are informative in that they reveal regime strength to power contenders. In a global game, this paper identifies two dictator types that are likely to interrupt election schedules. First, a dictator who believes he is so weak that he benefits from concealing his weakness. Second, a dictator who believes he is very strong to the extent that he can wipe out an armed challenge at a low cost. This paper provides empirical evidence for this model from an original Dataset of Autocratic Election Schedules (DAES). The DAES dataset covers a long series of global panel data about occurrences, schedules, and announcements of elections in autocratic regimes after World War II.