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This paper explains the Soviet Union’s failure to restrain China’s nuclear armament between 1954 and 1964. It attributes this failure to two international conditions limiting Moscow’s leverage vis-à-vis Beijing. The first is that the Soviet Union was a superpower sharing a land border with China. In the context of this contiguity, Moscow’s threats of sanctions against Beijing lost credibility because it was obvious that punitive measures could cause serious local troubles and jeopardize the Soviets’ core interests. In addition, Beijing feared being subordinated to its superpower neighbor and was hesitant to exchange its nuclear program for security guarantees by Moscow. The second condition is that the international system was bipolar with the Soviet Union and the United State as superpowers. Under bipolarity, Beijing was especially dependent on Moscow in terms of both security and economy, and therefore had a further reason to fear political subordination. Consequently, China became even less receptive to Moscow’s nuclear assurances. The paper corroborates these main arguments by drawing upon primary and secondary sources in Korean, Russian, and English, while challenging prominent theoretically grounded accounts.