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Existing research investigate the effects of foreign policy tools such as economic sanctions and human rights accusations on autocratic durability. However, there is no consistent evidence as to whether such destabilizing effect exists. I argue that the effect of foreign pressure depends on the ability of authoritarian leaders to narrow their ruling coalitions. By purging elites and concentrating personal power, leaders successfully mitigate the moral hazard caused by the foreign threat. As a result, autocratic leaders who purge their coalitions and consolidate personal power have better chance to sustain under external pressure. I use cross-section time-series data of all autocratic regimes after WWII to empirically test my hypotheses.