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The Politics of Local Pre-Election Party Coalitions: Post-Communist Experience

Thu, September 30, 8:00 to 9:30am PDT (8:00 to 9:30am PDT), TBA

Abstract

Pre-election party alliances have become a frequent phenomenon in post-Communist politics but research on their formation and characteristics is still rare. Especially glaring is the absence of studies explaining the appearance of joint lists in elections of local government officials, mayors and city and municipal councils. Given the fact that pre-election coalitions are a much more popular and preferred strategy in younger democracies, exploring the processes driving their formation is a task that deserves urgent attention. As previous research acknowledges (Ibenskas 2015), contextual features of transitional politics such as highly fragmented party systems with still weak ideological structure present challenges to the use of theories developed for consolidated democracies. The possible positive and negative consequences of party pre-election coalitions for democratic representation, public policy, and quality of governance at the local level where the effect on citizens’ everyday lives is the strongest, increase the importance of this type of research and its immediate implications.
How do pre-election party coalitions form in local government elections held in countries from Eastern Europe? It is puzzling that such alliances have been quite common, even more than at the national level; they consist of parties that may or may not run candidates in the mayoral races; and same parties do not form the same coalitions in all districts. This study offers three sets of explanations that may help explain variation in the size and ideological proximity of coalitions across districts by focusing on local context, the role of dominant players, and strategic coordination among the main participants. We use theoretical insights from the study of comparative institutions, post-Communist politics, and coalition building at the national level (Golder 2005, Ibenskas 2015). One novelty of our approach is that it considers the fact the variation in socio-economic and political conditions that may shape strategic behavior by parties in contrast to the line followed by party national headquarters. We also advance new propositions based on the role of concurrent elections at the municipal level and the possibility for an impact of a major populist party.
On the theoretical level, we hypothesize that parties make decisions on whether and which coalitions to join by careful calculation of their costs and benefits. In regard to coalition size, our first hypothesis is that higher levels of party fragmentation at the district level increase the chances for a larger coalition to emerge. Thus, the gains for parties increase since the chances to get represented are bigger. This should be reflected in the number, raw and effective, of coalition participants. Regarding programmatic proximity within a coalition, our next hypothesis states that more heterogeneous districts in socio-economic-demographic terms, yield pre-election coalitions that are less ideologically coherent. Our theoretical expectations are that coalitions with a populist participant are likely to be smaller, because of potential losses for such parties incurred as concessions to junior partners at the national level. It can also be expected that ideological coherence within coalitions including an antisystem party would be weaker, given the vagueness in the populists programmatic appeals and lack of ideological constraints. Finally, the paper develops a theoretical argument about a contamination effect of the majoritarian election of mayors on the election of municipal councilors through proportional representation. Drawing upon the literature on mixed election systems, we propose that coalitions with a party running a candidate in the mayoral race are larger because of a higher threshold imposed in the majoritarian contest. For the same reason, we also expect that such a coalition would be less ideologically coherent.
To verify these claims, we use data from several Eastern European young democracies: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. The unit of analysis is the coalition at a particular district. Pre-election party coalitions are documented for the last local election in each country, using official government documents and reliable online sources. This will help us also code variables for the presence of populist parties and parties running candidates for mayors. Data for district socio-economic specifics come from the World Bank Development Indicators collection. Party fragmentation by district will be computed by the authors using information from preceding local government elections. Ideological distance will be measured using the Comparative Manifesto Project, The Chapel Hill Survey, and the Euromanifesto Project. Regression analysis will be used to test our central hypotheses while controlling for other factors identified by previous research on national level coalitions and relevant for the district level as well.

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