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Aristotelian Pluralism: How to Think About the Common Good

Sat, October 2, 8:00 to 9:30am PDT (8:00 to 9:30am PDT), TBA

Abstract

The concept of the common good is essential to a just pluralism that would not deplete the solidarities needed for human flourishing. Though the moral language of common goods may seem strange or out of place in liberal societies that pride themselves on serving the good of individuals, the logic of acting together—in a family, school, club, or, more remotely, in politics—is nothing foreign to a democratic way of life. What is too often lacking is a moral vocabulary for articulating the distinctions that we enact every day.
This paper develops a political grammar of common goods that I call “Aristotelian pluralism.” Drawing on realist social ontology and the fin-de-siecle English pluralists as well as Aristotle and his readers, I show that each form of common action is to be reckoned as an end in itself, a form of solidarity with common goods of its own. Against atomistic versions of pluralism, I argue that human communities are legitimately oriented first to shared goals that are not reducible to (aggregated) individual goods. Against the Aristotelian monist, who yearns for a homogenous society dedicated to a single political project, I insist on the legitimate multiplicity of common goods, specified by particular forms of common action, which may or may not fit together neatly within a political order.
Every community is built around a common good, which is simply that it flourish in justice as whatever kind of emergently real community it is. The common good for a school is to be an excellent school, and the common good of an army is to be a flourishing army; neither goal can be finally reduced to anything non-social such as teachers’ pay or soldiers’ strength. More generally, wherever there is common action, there are ends that cannot be reduced to individual goals or benefits, so they must be measured by the common good. To ignore common ends, which are built into the social reality of any community, does not remove their normative pull, it only ensures that they will not be shared justly. We get at the common good of a given social order by asking after its normative social ontology—to what (and to whose) ends is it characteristically oriented, and how could these be justly achieved? As the “political animal,” human beings need to share in the common goods of various communities in order to live well. But particular associations need, or at any rate will find themselves under, some authoritative community imposing order on and among them (for better and for worse).
Politics, too, is form of common action that aims to establish a just order among communities that have common goods of their own, and are therefore loci of solidarity in their own right. For the Aristotelian realist, it is a descriptive fact that any regime—from a liberal republic to an ancient city-state to a Baroque despotism—aims to enact an overall vision of human life, and could not do otherwise. Yet it is too seldom noticed, by both proponents and critics of the common good as a political ideal, that an Aristotelian politics need not be articulated in a monolithic, quasi-totalitarian fashion. Rather, citizens’ common project of realizing a good life together should be pursued primarily in an authoritative order among human communities and their particular pursuits, without identifying the common good of citizens with human concerns in general. For the Aristotelian pluralist, every form of just human communion is a common good in its own right deserving of public respect, without denying the priority of politics and its shaping and ordering role.

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