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In their written opinions, courts not only establish legal rules, but also set the scope of these rules. They can choose to set policy narrowly, applying to a restricted set of future cases, or broadly, applying to a bigger set. Most precedent setting courts consist of multiple members, likely with varying preferences over policy and breadth. As a result, an opinion writing judge on a multi-member court faces a potential tradeoff between these two interests. While the opinion author might achieve policy closer to her ideal by writing a narrow opinion, she could still benefit from a broad opinion that sets policy farther away. In this paper, I develop a formal model of opinion writing on a court which allows judges to endogenously determine the scope of the rule. I characterize the conditions for broad or narrow opinions and the types of coalitions that support either. I show that all narrow opinions pass with ideologically connected coalitions, which consist entirely of ideologically adjacent judges. Ideologically disconnected coalitions, however, may only form in support of some broad opinions. Further, narrow opinions only occur if judges place differential weights on areas of the law.