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Local Budgets Allocation: Topic Models of Russian Public Procurement Contracts

Fri, October 1, 2:30 to 3:00pm PDT (2:30 to 3:00pm PDT), TBA

Abstract

Accountability trade-off can make local officials provide different types of goods for the local population. This study argues that the selection rule, which defines the accountability paths for local officials, can significantly impact the specifics of budget allocation. Using originally collected information on approximately 9 millions city-level public procurement contracts in Russia, I explore mayors' choices in budget allocation by looking at what types of goods they purchase. Each contract provides a description of goods that are obtained. I utilize these contract descriptions to classify the type of goods that are being procured: infrastructural (eg., construction contracts) and social (eg, provision of commodities for educational and medical facilities). I use a set of contracts that was financed by the city-level budgets and apply text-analysis and topic modeling to identify the groups of goods which local budgets fund. This allows me to characterize differences in budget allocation preferences and explore how these differences can be explained by institutional features of the cities and by individual mayors' characteristics. The paper predicts that the local mayors’ selection rule can have an impact on the type of goods that local officials spend the city resources on. It suggests that the main effects are explained by the local officials’ career concerns mechanism.

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