Balance of Power and Changes to Political Selection Mechanisms in China

• In Event: Institutional Change and Political Control in China

Abstract

How Chinese Communist Party officials are selected, and their work is evaluated, has drastically evolved since the Party’s creation. As they do not measure up to a democratization of the Party, these evolutions tend to be overlooked. At the same time, most studies on cadre recruitment focus on the progressive technocratization of the cadre corps, and the relative importance given to political recruitment criteria by opposition to technical ones. This paper establishes the first comprehensive survey of the evolution of political selection regulations since the party’s foundation. Going beyond the focus on criteria for recruitment and the red versus expert debate, it studies the changes to the selection mechanisms themselves and who has discretion over the decision, taking into account changes in levels of centralization/decentralization, transparency, as well as personalization. By contrast with a trend to explain political changes purely based on leaders’ individual preferences, this paper explores the institutional processes and elite configurations that enable the leaders, as well as constrain their choices. It stresses how changes to officials’ recruitment and promotion mechanisms, at different points in time, result from specific coalition-building strategies. It also highlights the long-term effects these changes may have on the party-state’s elite configuration. The study of political selection mechanisms hence allows us to trace over time the balance of power between different groups within the party-state.

Author

• Jerome Doyon, Harvard Kennedy School