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Why are the poor susceptible to clientelism, and what factors help shield them from the influence of targeted private inducements? In this paper, we explore the role of social networks -- both formal and informal -- in shaping the likelihood of being targeted with small economic incentives, and the probability that a poor voter will follow through with a vote bought. We argue that when the poor lack access to social networks outside of their immediate informal familial networks, they become increasingly reliant on the resources channeled through these informal networks, including forms of electoral clientelism. We explore whether such informal networks might also make possible the monitoring and enforcement of clientelistic exchanges, thus effectively trapping the poor in the clientelistic relationship. To test our theory, we rely on local naming conventions to build the informal, family-based network linkages between voters and local politicians spanning one whole city in the Philippines. We then collect survey data on formal network connections, the distribution of electoral handouts, as well as the beliefs and voting behavior of 900 voters randomly drawn from these family networks. We show first, that brokers do disproportionately target poorer voters. We then show that informal familial ties further influence targeting among poor voters---with poor central voters the most like to receive offers of electoral handouts. However, we find little evidence that being central in these informal networks makes voters (poor or otherwise) more susceptible to monitoring or enforcement from politicians or their agents. Finally, we show that access to alternative networks such as workers' associations, community organizations, and other formal organizations can mitigate voter fears of punishment for failing to reciprocate.