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Party and party system institutionalization—that is the organizational strength and embeddedness of political parties in society (Mainwaring and Scully 1995) and the extent to which they interact regularly in stable ways (Mainwaring 2018)—have been, with few exceptions (i.e. Coppedge 1994; Enyedi 2016; Morgan 2011 among others), considered beneficial for the survival of democratic politics. Institutionalized parties and party systems improve the quality and expertise of representatives (Levitsky 2018b), prevent the rise of anti-systemic outsiders, lengthen time horizons, increase accountability (Lupu 2015b, 2015a), and allow for stable public policies (Flores-Macias 2018). Yet, increasingly, countries deemed as having highly or increasingly more institutionalized party systems—like Honduras and Brazil in Latin America, the United States in North America, and Hungary in Europe—have seen their democracies backslide (Buzogány 2017; Levitsky 2018a; Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018). In all of these countries not only have potential autocrats risen to power, but they have to various degrees undermined free and fair elections, political rights, and civil liberties.
The interaction between party system institutionalization and polarization, we argue, can help explain why. Contrary to common wisdom, we suggest that, in contexts of intense polarization, party system institutionalization can be detrimental to democracy. In highly polarized systems society aligns in two camps with mutually exclusive interests and identities (McCoy, Rahman, and Somer 2018). Politics becomes a zero-sum game in which the win of a team is perceived as an absolute loss for the other team, and vice-versa. In strongly institutionalized party systems, where political parties have strong roots in society, well organized structures, and well-defined recognizable labels, political polarization is likely to occur along party lines. Politicians who have party rather than personal reputations, cannot credibly distance themselves from their parties, or safely reach across the aisle even if their own leadership is undermining basic democratic norms. That is not the case in weakly institutionalized party systems where political parties have weaker roots in society, less organized and/or disciplined party structures, and more diluted party labels. In these contexts, politicians have incentives to foster personal rather than party reputations (Carey and Shugart 1995). They can, therefore, more easily detach themselves from their parties and reach across the aisle without hurting their name or electoral prospects. In this situation cross-party cooperation against democratic backsliding, as well as the creation of new opposition alliances or parties become much more likely.
We assess this argument with a mixed methods approach. We use large-n quantitative analysis to tests the correlation between democratic backsliding and the interaction between polarization and party system institutionalization across the world. We use comparative political analysis to evaluate the causal mechanisms that underlie the process using three cases with different levels of democratic backsliding. Hungary, where Viktor Orbán transformed the country into a competitive authoritarian regime, the United States where notwithstanding significant democratic backslide Donald Trump was not able to transform the country into a competitive authoritarian regime, and Colombia where despite polarization and various attempts to undermine democratic institutions Alvaro Uribe was unable to erode democracy.