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Does defense cooperation lead to burden sharing, or does it lead instead to free riding? This question represents a longstanding puzzle in international relations. The challenge is that governments must allocate resources to defense in order to achieve security improvements, but they have strong incentives to free ride on the efforts of their partners. We introduce three innovations. First, we shift focus from formal military alliances, such as NATO, to bilateral defense cooperation agreements (DCAs). Alliances represent only a small fraction of substantive defense cooperation. Further, new alliances are rarely signed; the overall structure of the global alliance system has remained static for decades. By contrast, DCAs are now ubiquitous, numbering well into the thousands. These agreements implement frameworks that attempt to coordinate a wide range of defense activities, from joint military exercises to defense research to arms trade, and they thus provide a novel opportunity to explore burden-sharing problems.
Second, we conceptualize defense cooperation as a selection-influence dynamic. When selecting an optimal amount of defense effort, governments respond to the commitments they've made to their DCA partners. But governments also strategically select defense partners in such a way as to maximize their security benefits while minimizing costs. We cannot accurately estimate the effect of defense partnerships on burden sharing without simultaneously modeling the process of strategic partner selection.
Third, we conceptualize defense cooperation as a global network of bilateral ties. A government's defense effort depends not only on its bilateral defense commitments, but also its position within the global network. Tendencies toward transitivity and closure, evidenced by numerous "closed triads" in the network, lead to the formation of dense local groups of defense partners, where small clusters of states have more extensive ties to one another than to any other states in the network. In principle, these dense local clusters enhance security. But they also exacerbate the free rider problem by allowing countries to displace defense burdens to their various partners. States thus face conflicting influences. On the one hand, their direct DCA partnerships put upward pressure on defense expenditures. On the other hand, dense clusters of defense partners reduce the incentive to allocate resources to defense.
Using new data on defense cooperation, we estimate a series of simultaneous network coevolution models. These models account for both selection-influence dynamics and complex network effects. The analysis leads to a paradoxical conclusion. Ceteris paribus, DCA partnerships increase defense expenditures. But when those partnerships embed countries in dense groups of collaborators, expenditures decline. The analysis reveals the importance of considering both defense cooperation beyond alliances and the broader structural context in which defense cooperation occurs.