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Security Assistance and Military Behavior

Thu, September 30, 12:00 to 1:30pm PDT (12:00 to 1:30pm PDT), TBA

Abstract

Does security assistance restrain developing militaries at home or does it empower them to commit human rights abuses and conduct coups by building up their material capacity? The United States, like other liberal powers, uses security assistance (i.e., arms and training) not only to build capacity but also to impart norms of restraint in developing militaries. In this paper, I argue that norm violations can occur not because security assistance fails to impart norms, but because it does not impart them quickly enough relative to increases in military capacity. Militaries with enhanced capabilities from security assistance may be more likely to intervene politically or abuse human rights, at least in the short run. To test this argument, I use an original dataset on US security assistance, military involvement in politics, and human rights abuses in Africa between 1999-2018. The dataset provides 24 indicators of military behavior across political, legal, economic, and societal institutions. The cross-national analyses use models that account for “who gets assistance,” because underlying state fragility may drive allocation of training as well as norm-violating behavior. This study has implications for theories of security assistance and civil-military relations, as well as US foreign policy in weak and transitional democracies.

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