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The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is the primary multilateral institution for coordinating joint responses to armed conflict. In recent decades, however, not all armed conflicts have reached the Council’s formal agenda, and an even smaller share have been met with any of type of substantive response. What explains why the UNSC places some armed conflict on its agenda while it disregards others? Once conflicts have entered its agenda, what determines the type of response the Council agrees on, if any? Previous studies have identified some factors that shape agenda setting in the Council, but there exist no studies that connect agenda setting to decision-making. Given that decisions can only be taken once issues are placed on the formal agenda, it is crucial to examine these two steps together. In this paper, we draw on international law scholarship and international relations theory to develop and test a novel theoretical framework for how agenda setting shapes decision-making in the UNSC. To test this framework, we combine a range of quantitative data sources with independently collected data on UNSC debates and decisions in the 1989-2019 period. Our preliminary findings indicate that the Council’s agenda and decision-making are determined by conflict characteristics, the interests of the permanent members of the Security Council, and institutional stickiness. The findings have important implications for debates about UN agenda setting, responsiveness, and legitimacy.