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In Open Democracy Hélène Landemore envisions a new “paradigm” of democracy that, she argues, would realize political equality better than any alternative political arrangement and, for that reason, also produce better decisions. The book is riven by substantial tensions and ambiguities, for instance in its movement back and forth between Manin (1997) and Urbinati’s (2006) conceptions of the relation between direct and representative democracy. What is clear, however, is that Landemore has provided the most thorough defence yet of the idea that replacing elections with lotteries would improve the wisdom and legitimacy of democratic decision (Abizadeh 2020; Bohman 2012; Cf. Dryzek and Niemeyer 2008; Gastil and Wright 2019; Guerrero 2014; Van Reybrouck 2016). The electoral paradigm of democracy, she argues, is grounded in the outdated idea that democracy involves citizens selecting or consenting to the rule of competent leaders. The most important problem with this idea is that, as Landemore argued in Democratic Reason (2013), decisions made by groups that are cognitively diverse (in a specific way) tend to be better than those made by groups whose members are individually competent. Choosing legislators by lottery rather than election, she argues, would therefore tend to improve their deliberations and decisions – and it would do so by making parliaments more democratic, in the sense of aligning them with the Aristotelian idea of ruling and being ruled in turn.
But there are reasons to be wary of pluralizing legislative deliberation with lottocratic representation. Elections, parties, and legislatures with clear lines of division between their members play a crucial role in engaging ordinary people with political decision-making and mobilizing them effectively in defence of their interests, as not only populists (Green 2010; Laclau 2005) but also defenders of strong parties and robust partisanship (Rosenbluth and Shapiro 2018; White and Ypi 2016) have argued. These kinds of insights may be especially important in the European Union, when transnational partisanship could help build constituent power across borders (Patberg 2020), and in other ethno-linguistically divided polities, where political fragmentation poses serious dangers (Horowitz 1992; Reilly 2001; 2002). They are buttressed by the largest and most sophisticated cross-national study of political equality, which finds that the participation gap between more and less educated citizens tends to grow when legislatures are more pluralistic (Gallego 2015).
This paper argues that, from an epistemic democratic perspective, the value of a pluralistic lottocratic legislature is profoundly ambiguous. Landemore’s argument involves a selective appropriation of elements from a Habermasian vision of legislative politics that ignores Habermas’ own recognition of the epistemic value of forceful moral advocacy and (more recently) of “democratic polarization” (Habermas 2016). It depends on an overly-direct application of the findings of experiments with agent-based models of problem-solving processes (Hong and Page 2004; Page 2007). Those models work when people have different beliefs and stop working when people have diverse values (Page 2007, 240) and therefore serve as a misleading – and arguably a dangerous – basis for reforming real political decision-making. It is in situations of value-diversity that the inclusion of the mass public via partisan-electoral linkage becomes important, since it gives citizens a reason to stay engaged and mobilized around formal political institutions, rather than simply tuning them out (Lafont 2020; Urbinati 2006). Finally, Landemore’s proposal is buttressed with the claim that private actors and bureaucrats have never captured a minipublic and turned it to their own ends (Landemore 2020, 196–97; but see Freschi and Mete 2009; Johnson 2015; Lee 2015). Adopting an epistemic perspective on parliamentary politics reveals that a more pluralistic lottocratic legislature may well be easier for powerful actors to capture than an elected chamber, because it would exacerbate information asymmetries between people and groups with more or less resources, creating moral hazard and adverse selection problems that undermine the collective ability of the latter to push back against the undue influence of the former. The resulting loss of agency can undermine the openness of collective decision-making practices to diverse contributions from citizens, reducing the reliability with which legislative decision-making arrives at true, just, and generally beneficial outcomes. For these three reasons, the central institutional recommendation of Open Democracy stands in a profoundly ambiguous relation to the epistemic democratic values that are supposed to underwrite it – one that threatens to reduce the quality of decision-making by fragmenting legislative deliberation and representation in a way that excludes less powerful citizens from political life.